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ABSTRACT 
 
I use a reduced form regression model to determine the extent to which population aging 
accounts for economic growth in each of the nine regions of the world. Predominantly, I build 
upon the research of Bloom et al. (2010), which is central to formulating my regression equation. 
I separate the difference between each region’s average growth rate from the world average 
growth rate into demographic and non-demographic effects using the estimated coefficients. The 
results suggest that more economically developed regions have potentially benefited from 
population aging, while less economically developed regions have not.  
 
JEL classification: J14, J21, J26, O10, O40 
Keywords: Population Aging, Economic Growth, Economic Policy, Labor-force Participation, Life 
Expectancy, Retirement Age 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 It is well known that over the next fifty years most developed nations will experience a 
significant aging of their population. The United Nations recently projected that during this time 
period the average share of the old-aged population is expected to double in the major 
industrialized countries (Fougère & Mérette, 1999). In fact, over the past fifty years Japan, as 
one of the most extreme examples, has already seen significant population aging, with an 
increase in its old-age share from 5.7% in 1960 to 23.0% in 2010, and a decrease in its youth-age 
share from 30.2% in 1960 to 13.3% in 2010 (World Development Indicators). It is predicted that 
these demographic changes will have substantial fiscal and economic consequences (Fougère & 
Mérette, 1999). Studying the implications of these aging populations on economic growth is 
therefore a very interesting and relevant subject matter as countries prepare for, and respond to, 
significant demographic changes.  
 Rather than focusing on the implications of population aging on economic growth for an 
individual country, I compare the nine regions of the world: North America, Latin America, 
Europe, the Middle East & North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, East Asia, Southeast 
Asia and Oceania. Not only does this provide necessary cross sectional variation in the data, it 
provides interesting comparative results, particularly from a policy standpoint. The goal of this 
empirical study is to construct a reduced form regression model that measures the effect of 
population aging on economic growth. The results from this regression model are then used to 
separate each regions growth into demographic and non-demographic components. The 
overarching question this research paper seeks to answer is: How much of a region’s economic 
growth can be accounted for by its demographic changes? The findings suggest that well-
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developed regions have potentially benefited from population aging, while less developed 
regions have not. The discussion focuses on a two-way relationship between population aging 
and economic growth, rather than a causal relationship.  
 This paper contributes to and builds on the existing literature. Numerous research papers 
have used Overlapping Generation (OLG) models to simulate the impacts of population aging on 
economic growth (Fougère & Mérette, 1999). The most important study upon which my research 
builds is by Bloom, Canning & Finlay (2010). To my knowledge, their study is the only one to 
have used a reduced form regression analysis to study the statistical relationship between 
population aging and economic growth. They undertook their study focused specifically on Asia. 
The most significant contribution of my research to previous literature is its global focus, as the 
first study to compare the aging impacts on growth across nine regions of the world.  
 In Section II of this research proposal I provide a detailed review of the most relevant 
literature pertaining to this subject matter, in particular to Bloom et al.’s 2010 study. This is 
followed by Section III, which provides a detailed theoretical framework for my study focused 
on growth theory and the regression equation formulation. In Section IV, I describe the various 
data sources that are available for the variables in my analyses. Section V provides a discussion 
on the empirical specifications and results of my research, followed by Section VI for concluding 
remarks.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 Previous empirical studies on population aging and economic growth use either 
Overlapping Generation (OLG) models or reduced form regression models. In this section I first 
provide a brief overview of OLG models and the important findings from studies that take this 
approach. Following this, I discuss in depth the research that uses reduced form regression 
models since this is the most relevant to my study.  
In general, Overlapping Generation (OLG) models are based on the life-cycle theory of 
savings behavior and model various overlapping generations living side by side at each point in 
time (Hviding and Mérette, 1998). While many studies use an OLG model with agents living in 
two periods of life and having an endogenous probability of surviving for a third period 
(Blackburn & Cipriani, 2002), others use models with up to fifteen overlapping generations 
(Fougère & Mérette, 1999). Each agent maximizes their utility depending on their preferences 
over consumption and the number of children, which can vary depending on the study (Zhang et 
al., 2001). Researchers who focus on population aging and economic growth often modify the 
OLG model to include endogenous-growth features, which are generally expected to arise from 
the accumulation of both physical and human capital (Fougère & Mérette, 1999).  
There are various important findings from many of these studies. Firstly, in their study of 
seven OECD countries, Fougère and Mérette (1999) find that future generations could have 
sufficient incentive to invest more in human capital and in turn increase economic growth, even 
if there are reductions in saving levels and physical capital returns. Another significant finding is 
by Zhang et al. (2001), who conclude that fertility, human capital investment and growth are 
affected by increases in longevity, with the net effect being a decline in fertility, and an incline in 
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both human capital investment and growth. They also find that the level of these effects depends 
on the relative strength of the tastes for the number and welfare of children (Zhang et al., 2001). 
Finally, Futagami and Nakajima (2001) find that population aging does not necessarily have a 
negative impact on economic growth and that the implementation of a policy that postpones the 
retirement age would have a dampening effect on growth. This analysis remains brief since I do 
not build on these approaches in my research methodology, but the results are interesting and 
inform my study.  
 To my knowledge, there has only been one previous study, by Bloom et al. (2010), that 
has used a reduced form regression model. For this reason, this study will serve as a key resource 
for my research, in particular in constructing my regression equation. The authors begin by 
providing the necessary background of Asia’s demographic changes over the study period. This 
is followed by their regression analysis to find the statistical relationship between the youth-age 
and old-age shares and economic growth. Finally, they discuss other channels by which age-
structure shifts impact economic growth, including behavioral responses and institutional 
settings.   
 Bloom et al.’s (2010) study analyzes the time period beginning 1960 and ending 2005. 
During this time the key drivers of Asia’s significant aging population were declining fertility, 
increased life expectancy and the transitional dynamics of varying cohort sizes moving through 
the age distribution. For example, the fertility rate in the Republic of Korea plummeted from 5.7 
to 1.1 over this time period, and Japan boasts the highest life expectancy in the world. The short-
run effects of the declining fertility include a decrease in the youth-age share of the population 
and an increase in the working-age share of the population. From these effects they derive that 
GDP (or income) per capita is likely to grow in the short-run. However, the authors focus their 
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attention on the long-run effects stemming from the fertility rate falling below the replacement 
rate for many Asian countries. In turn, this causes the working-age share to decrease and the old-
age share to increase (Bloom et al., 2010).  
Based on the results of previous studies, Bloom et al. (2010) hypothesize that the 
population aging in Asia has positively contributed to economic growth. These studies indicated 
that one-third of Asia’s ‘economic miracle’ was the result of their huge demographic changes 
(Bloom et al., 2003). In addition, Kelley and Schmidt (2005) predicted that 44 percent of Asia’s 
income per capita growth could be attributed to its changing age-structure. They attributed these 
effects predominantly to the decline in fertility, which increased the relative number of people in 
the working-age category. It is likely that a larger workforce will have increased total output and 
thus income per capita. By contrast, it had been suggested that a large portion of Africa’s 
economic distress could be accounted for by its lack of demographic change (Bloom & Sachs, 
1998). 
Since prior studies thoroughly document the effect of the working-age share on economic 
growth, Bloom et al. (2010) instead focus on the youth-age and old-age shares. This is because, 
when focusing on the working-age share, the downward forces of the youth and old-age shares 
are assumed to be symmetric. My study will take the same approach as Bloom et al. (2010), by 
removing this symmetry and treating the youth and old-age shares separately.  
The second major section of Bloom et al.’s study is the derivation of a reduced form 
regression model to find the empirical relationship between population aging and economic 
growth. They use the following regression model:  
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Where, 
• ln(yt) – ln(yt-1) is economic growth, where yt is GDP per capita  
• edu is the education level, calculated as the average years of secondary schooling 
• cap is the level of the capital stock, calculated by interpolation of capital investment data 
•  inst is the institutional quality, measured by trade openness, the Freedom House Polity 
Index and other factors that impact labor productivity, such as life expectancy 
• c is the youth-age share, calculated as the percentage of the population aged 14 years and 
below, and Δc is the change in the youth-age 
• o is the old-age share, calculated as the percentage of the population aged 65 years and 
above, and Δot is the change in the old-age share  
• δi and δt are some time invariant country fixed effects, using dummy variables for 
characteristics such as the fraction of land in the tropics or whether the country is 
landlocked or not 
• εit is a random error term 
 
The regression provides various interesting results, with the most relevant being the 
coefficients on the youth and old-age shares. Firstly, the long-run effect on economic growth of 
an increase in the level of the old-age population share is negative, but not significant. 
Alternatively, the long-run effect on economic growth of an increase in the level of the youth-age 
population share is in fact both negative and significant. This implies that a 10% decrease in the 
youth-age share will cause an increase in economic growth of 2.2%. Both of these main findings 
of Bloom et al. (2010) are consistent with those of Kelley and Schmidt (2005).  
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The authors discuss the realities of population aging and the behavioral responses and 
institutional settings that make the results more complicated (Bloom et al., 2010). These 
behavioral changes predominantly impact labor supply, savings patterns and education level. 
Firstly, the change in family structure increases labor supply since the greater portion of elderly 
people can care for the youth-age, allowing the working-age to work more. Additionally, the 
decline in fertility increases female labor supply since women have fewer children to care for. 
Secondly, savings patterns change as life expectancy, income potential, and expenditure 
requirements change. Previous studies that focus on the link between national savings rates and 
demographic structure suggest that much of East Asia’s savings boom can be attributed to its 
population’s changing age structure (Higgins, 1998). Thirdly, there is much evidence showing 
that as the population ages the working-age share increases their investment in education for the 
youth-age share. Lastly, there are country specific institutional factors involved, in particular 
issues surrounding who will support the elderly: the state through social security, individual 
retirement savings, or the labor supply of the elderly themselves. Combining the changes in 
demographic variables, behavioral responses and institutional factors, the authors find that aging 
has an ambiguous effect on economic growth (Bloom et al., 2010).  
My research builds on Bloom et al.’s 2010 study, since it is the only research that has 
used a reduced form regression model to test the statistical relationship between population aging 
and economic growth. In the first part of my study, I adopt their regression model, while making 
several minor adjustments. Rather than focusing solely on Asia however, the model is used to 
study nine regions of the world. This is the major contribution that my study makes to existing 
literature, since it is the first at a global level. A study of this nature is important since it allows 
the results for each region of the world to be compared. These regions differ widely in terms of 
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economic development, political freedoms and human rights. Furthermore, the use of a reduced 
form regression model rather than an OLG model makes such an expansive regional comparison 
possible within the time frame of the research. The second part of my study extends beyond this 
regression model and uses a mathematical equation to answer the question: How much of a 
region’s economic growth can be accounted for by its population aging?  
 
 
 
III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
Understanding economic growth theory is crucial for constructing the methodology of 
my research. In this section I firstly provide an overview of the Solow-Swan Model and Growth 
Accounting, in order to understand the basic drivers of economic growth and how population 
aging impacts these drivers. This is followed by the theories used by Bloom et al. (2010) to 
determine the initial regression model, which also informs my regression model. 
In 1956, Robert Solow and Trevor Swan derived an exogenous growth model, which we 
call the Solow-Swan Model (Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 2004). The core of their neoclassical model 
is a production function with the basic form:  
 𝑌 𝑡 =   𝐹[𝐾 𝑡 , 𝐿 𝑡 ,𝑇 𝑡 ] 
 
Where, Y(t) is the flow of output produced at time t, K(t) is the capital stock (durable physical 
inputs) at time t, L(t) is the quantity of labor at time t, and T(t) is the level of knowledge or 
technology at time t. In other words, the Solow-Swan model tells us that the level of output in an 
economy is a function of capital, labor and technology (Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 2004). The 
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production function is often assumed to take the Cobb-Douglas form, since it is thought to 
provide a reasonable description of actual economies. It takes the form: 𝑌 =   𝐴𝐾∝𝐿!!∝ 
Where A>0  is the level of technology, and α is a constant between zero and one (Barro & Sala-i-
Martin, 2004).   
This neoclassical production function has the following properties: constant returns to 
scale, positive and diminishing returns to private inputs, Inada conditions and essentiality (Barro 
& Sala-i-Martin, 2004). Figure 1.1 shows such a production function expressed in intensive 
form, or per capita form. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Growth accounting is an empirical methodology originating from the Solow-Swan 
production function (Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 2004). It allows GDP growth to be broken into 
changes in factor inputs and production technologies. The following growth accounting equation 
is found by taking logarithms and derivatives of the production function: 
 
Source: Acemoglu, D. (MIT) 
 
Figure 1.1: Solow-Swan Model  
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𝑌𝑌 = 𝑔 + 𝑠! 𝐾𝐾 + 𝑠! 𝐿𝐿 
In this equation Ẏ/Y is the derivative representing the growth rate of GDP, g is the growth rate of 
technological change, 𝐾/K is the derivative representing the growth rate of capital stock and 𝐿/L 
is the derivative representing the growth rate of labor. In addition, sK is the fraction of GDP used 
to pay rent capital (the capital share), and sL is the fraction of GDP used to pay wages (the labor 
share). In this form, it is also assumed that factor markets are competitive. As such, this equation 
tells us that the growth rate of GDP can be decomposed into the growth rate of capital, labor and 
technology (Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 2004). 
Since sK and sL can be estimated empirically, g is determined as the residual or difference 
between the growth rate of GDP and the part of the growth rate that can be accounted for by 
capital and labor growth. The following equation is rearranged to solve for ĝ, which is known as 
Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth or the Solow Residual (Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 2004): 
  𝑔 =   𝑌𝑌 − 𝑠!   𝐾𝐾 − 𝑠! 𝐿𝐿 
 
Understanding the Solow-Swan Model and Growth Accounting is important when 
considering the impacts of population aging on economic growth. The production function and 
growth accounting formula make clear that GDP can only grow if there is growth in productive 
inputs – capital, labor and the level of technology (or TFP) (Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 2004). When 
examining the long-run demographic changes of an aging population - that is, an increase in the 
old-age share and a decrease in the youth-age share - it is expected that economic growth would 
decline (Bloom et al., 2010). This is because population aging is expected to cause a decrease in 
both the labor supply per capita, which decreases the labor variable, and savings per capita, 
which decreases the capital variable. However, as previously discussed in the literature review, 
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when including both behavioral responses and institutional factors, the overall impact on 
economic growth is ambiguous (Bloom et al., 2010). 
Other relevant theory for this study is that used by Bloom et al. (2010) in the construction 
of their reduced form regression model. It is particularly important since their regression 
equation is used as the starting point for mine. They use the convergence model framework of 
Bloom & Canning (2008), and divide the population into youth-age, C, working-age, WA, and 
old-age, O. Firstly, they characterize growth of GDP per worker as the distance from steady 
state: 
 
Where z* is GDP per worker at time t, and z0 is the steady state GDP per worker. They refer to 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin’s (2004) discrete time models which find a log-linearization around the 
steady state, where z = log(Y/L). Additionally, since there is a vector of variables, X, that can 
affect the steady-state level of labor productivity, this equation becomes:  
 
In order to include the age structure with this theory of convergence, the authors use the 
following relationship used in Bloom and Canning (2008): 
 
 
Where Y is GDP, N is the total population, WA is the number of people in the working age, and L 
is the number of people participating in the labor force. The authors then assume that the 
working-age share represents the age structure and that the participation rate is constant, and 
break down the growth of income per capita in the following way: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
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At this point, equation (2) can explain growth of income per worker, gY/L. The authors then 
determine the growth of the working-age share, g(WA/N). Since the working-age is the population 
less the youth-age and old-age population, the equation becomes: 
 
They firstly use the difference of logs to approximate the working-age share growth: 
 
 
This growth equation is then redefined so that WA=N-C-O: 
 
 
Using the approximation, ln(1-x) ≈ x, for the increasing working-age share, they assert that: 
 
   
 
They label each of the following:  
 
 
 
And find that y = z + w by taking the logarithms of equation (3).  
Finally, they substitute these derived formulas into the income per capita growth equation above:   
 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
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The authors find that this final equation can be used to estimate the effects of youth-age 
and old-age dependency on growth of income per capita. Included in this equation are the 
explanatory variables, X, that describe the level of GDP per worker. These include the capital 
stock, education, institutional quality and other variables that impact labor productivity. Thus the 
estimated regression equation is: 
 
 
 
This is the equation I use in the first part of my methodology, although I remove both the 
capital stock, cap, and the country fixed effects, δi. Firstly, I take the theoretical reasoning from 
the research of Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) for removing capital stock from the growth 
equation. In their paper they derive an empirical formula for income per capita that does not rely 
on the level of capital stock, given that initial income is also included on the right hand side of 
the regression equation. Furthermore, I remove country fixed effects, as country variations are 
relevant to the comparative nature of my study. In other words, I am interested in how country-
specific features of the data affect growth.  
 
 
(10) 
(11) 
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IV. DATA 
 
 Table 1.1 provides a set of descriptive statistics for each variable in my operational 
dataset including means, standard deviations, minimums and maximums. The table shows the 
significant variation that exists across countries and through time, especially when comparing the 
minimum and maximum values for each of the variables. A noticeable example of this is for the 
life expectancy variable, which has a mean value of 62 years, a minimum of 24 years and a 
maximum of 83 years. The table also shows the expected demographic changes of an aging 
population, with an average decrease in the youth-age share and an average increase in the old-
age share.  Additionally, Table 1.2 provides a list of the countries separated into their regions 
that are included in the dataset.  
The data for my regression analysis was available from a variety of sources. The first 
source of data was the Penn World Tables 7.1, which provides purchasing power parity and 
national income accounts converted to international prices for 189 countries from 1950-2010. By 
converting expenditure entries into a common set of prices in a common currency, the tables 
allow users to compare ‘real’ quantities, between countries and over time. These tables were 
used for attaining data for the GDP per capita variable and for the trade openness variable, which 
used a calculation involving imports and exports. 
The second data source was the World Development Indicators produced by the World 
Bank, which provide the most accurate global development data. This was used primarily for 
demographic data for the following variables: youth-age share, old-age share, change in youth-
age share, change in old-age share, and life expectancy.  
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 The third data source was from Barro and Lee (2001), which provides three different 
education datasets to choose from: education attainment for population aged 15 years and over, 
education attainment for population aged 25 years and over, and education attainment by age 
group. For the education variable in this study I use the education attainment for the population 
aged 15 years and over, which is described as the average years of secondary school education, 
since it was effective in the study of Bloom et al. (2010).  
 Finally, the Freedom House Polity Index was used for the political freedom variable 
within the institutional quality variable. Freedom House is a non-governmental organization in 
the United States that assesses each country’s degree of political freedoms and civil liberties. 
This was simply collected online and was calculated by subtracting the degree of autocracy from 
the degree of democracy.  
 It is clear from the above sources that data were widely available for the variables in my 
regression model. More importantly, there are many countries included in the datasets from 
within the nine regions, which provides me with a rich cross section of data. Upon closer 
examination of the data there is also a significant range of countries represented: high to low 
income, low to high fertility rates, low to high infant mortality rates, etc.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	   19 
A limitation of the data is that not every country has data for each of the variables for 
every year since 1960. The implications are that if a given year for a particular country does not 
have data for every variable, then the entire year for that country will be removed from the 
regression analysis. These missing data points correspond, in many cases, to less developed 
countries in the early part of my sample period.  
There are two additional notes that should be made regarding the variables for the 
regression model. Firstly, to represent the institutional quality of nations and variables that 
impact labor productivity, the following variables are used: trade openness, Freedom House 
Polity Index and life expectancy. I also note that capital stock data are only available from the 
World Development Indicators from 1950 to 1980 for 64 countries. Furthermore, these series 
have been discounted due to difficulties associated with their calculation and underlying 
modeling assumptions. In the Solow model, discussed earlier, the capital stock is an important 
driver of economic growth. However, I use the findings of Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), 
who show that the inclusion of capital stock for a country is not necessary in the formula for 
economic growth, as long as initial income is included as a right-hand side variable.   
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V. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION 
 
Population Aging Graphed 
 To begin a discussion of the empirical specification of the study, I have created graphs 
showing the weighted average aging and economic growth in each region. These are useful for 
understanding the general trends of the youth-age, working-age and old-age shares of the 
populations in each region from 1960-2010, and also how these compare to growth performance 
during this time period. Figures 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4 show the youth-age, old-age, and working-age 
shares, respectively, for each region between the years 1960 and 2010.  
 
 
 
 
 
Data Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank  
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Data Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank  
Data Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank  
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The above graphs show that all regions are experiencing a decline in the youth-age share 
of their populations and an incline in both the old-age and working-age shares of their 
populations. In other words, their populations are aging. The extent of these demographic 
changes differs significantly between regions, with East Asia and Europe experiencing the most 
extensive changes. The following two graphs, Figures 1.5 and 1.6, show the demographic trends 
specifically for each of these regions over the 50-year period. 
These charts show that for both East Asia and Europe, the old-age shares essentially 
double and the youth-age shares halve. In fact, Europe experiences a complete shift in their age 
structure, where the old-age share of the population actually overtakes the youth-age share. Since 
East Asia’s development lags that of Europe, we could predict that the same trend will occur in 
the future for East Asia, as we see these two lines in the chart moving closer together. It is clear 
that there are significant demographic changes occurring in all regions, in particular for East 
Asia and Europe, and this study will determine to what extent these changes affected the level of 
economic growth.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank  
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The average population shares for each region in the above charts were calculated by 
weighting each nation by its population share in each year. Unfortunately, this potentially masks 
some of the aging that is occurring at the individual country level. For example, Japan’s old age 
share has increased from 5.7% in 1960 to 23.0% in 2010, although the above graph only shows 
an increase from 4.2% to 9.7% in the respective years in the region of East Asia. This is due to 
China’s overpowering population share in the region.  
It is interesting to also look at population aging at the country level, since it puts into 
perspective the demographic changes that are occurring in countries we are all familiar with. For 
this reason I have graphed in Figures 1.7 and 1.8 the youth and old-age share changes over the 
fifty-year period for the United States, Japan and Zimbabwe. These are three countries in 
completely different regions of the world, and reflect the same comparative aging trends as the 
regional charts.  
Data Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank  
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These charts show that, of the three countries, Japan experienced the most extensive 
population changes between 1960 and 2010. Its youth-age share effectively halved, and its old-
age share increased to four times its original share of the population. The United States also saw 
population aging, but to a lesser extent over the fifty year period. Finally, Zimbabwe experienced 
Data Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank  
Data Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank  
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relatively little, if any changes in its youth and old-age shares. Each of these trends is in line with 
the regional trends in Figures 1.2 and 1.3.  
Figure 1.9 shows the average GDP growth per capita for East Asia and Europe from 1960 
to 2010. It shows that this growth fluctuates significantly throughout the 50-year period, but 
there seems to be a general downward trend, especially for Europe. How much of this can be 
attributed to the population aging occurring in these regions, as seen in the previous graphs, is 
the goal of this empirical study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Empirical Approach 
 Using regression analysis, I seek to answer the following research question: How much 
of the economic growth in each region can be explained by population aging? The first step in 
this approach requires running one ‘world’ regression model that uses data from all 122 
countries. As the second step in this approach, I can then use the resulting demographic 
coefficients in a formula for each region that separates the economic growth into demographic 
and non-demographic effects.  
Data Source: Penn World Tables, 7.1  
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Empirical Model 
As previously discussed, I begin by using the regression equation of Bloom et al. (2010), 
but remove the capital stock variable and the country fixed effects. As such, the following 
regression model will be used to determine the statistical relationship between population aging 
and economic growth: 
 ln 𝑦!" − ln 𝑦!"!! = 𝛽! ln 𝑦!"!! +   𝛽!𝑒𝑑𝑢!"!! +   𝛽!𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡!"!! +   𝛽!𝑐!"!! +  𝛽!𝑜!"!! +   𝛽!∆𝑐!" +   𝛽!∆𝑜!" + 𝛿! +   𝜀!"  
 
The variables are as follows: 
Dependent Variable 
 ln 𝑦!" − ln 𝑦!"!! : Economic growth, change in GDP per capita 
Independent Variables 
 ln 𝑦!"!! : Natural log of GDP per capita 
 𝑒𝑑𝑢: Average years of secondary schooling 
 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡: Institutional quality 
 𝑐: Youth-age share 
 𝑜: Old-age share  
 ∆𝑐: Change in youth-age share 
 ∆𝑜: Change in old-age share 
 𝛿!: Time fixed effects 
 𝜀!": Residual/Error term 
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In order to remove short-term business cycle effects I treat the natural time period for the 
model as five years. This five-year time period is used for each of the variables, such that the 
first time period begins in 1960, the second in 1965 and so forth.  
This regression model is essentially showing that I, along with previous researchers, 
believe that education (human capital), institutional quality and variables that influence labor 
productivity are sufficient in explaining differences in economic growth across countries and 
time. Under this assumption, this study is able to determine the degree to which demographic 
changes also play a role in economic growth.  
The second part of the methodology involves using the following equation that separates 
the variables into demographic and non-demographic effects for each region separately. The 
equation uses Southeast Asia as an example: 
  𝑦!"# −   𝑦!"#$%    = 𝛽!!  !"#. 𝑥!!"# − 𝑥!!"#$%    + 𝛽!!  !"!!!"#. 𝑥!!"# − 𝑥!!"#$%    +   ℯ!"# 
 
It can be seen that the demographic and non-demographic variables have been separated 
using the relevant estimated coefficients from the regression results. The results from the above 
equation are displayed in a bar chart enabling comparison between regions. As such, this 
equation can be used to answer the research question: How much of the economic growth in each 
region can be accounted for by population aging?  
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Results 
Table 1.3 provides the results from the world regression equation, which include: the 
estimated coefficients on the independent variables, the level of statistical significance, and key 
additional regression statistics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The independent variables that directly relate to the research question are the 
demographic variables: Youth-Age Share, Old-Age Share, Change in Youth-Age Share, and 
Change in Old-Age Share. The results show that the youth-age share coefficient, with a value of 
-0.0016, is statistically significant at the one percent level. I employ a thought experiment to 
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better interpret and understand this coefficient. If a country’s youth-age share declined by 10 
percentage points over a 50-year period, this would have resulted in a 0.32% increase in 
economic growth1. This is a reasonable and relevant estimate since the youth-age share in the 
United States declined by 11 percentage points (Penn World Table 7.1) over this time period. 
This result is interesting since it is at odds with the growth accounting hypothesis, that 
population aging has negative impacts on economic growth. This finding is however relevant to 
the findings of Bloom et al. (2010) who also found that a decreasing youth-age share has positive 
impacts on economic growth. The most likely cause for this finding is that there are fewer youth-
aged individuals who are dependent on the working-age population. A closely related variable is 
the change in youth-age share, which is statistically significant at the five percent level. This tells 
us that the amount of the youth-age share decline between two periods affects the size of the 
economic growth effect.   
The estimated coefficient on old-age share, with a value of -0.0015, is statistically 
significant at the five percent level. If interpreted again using the same thought experiment, a 10 
percentage point increase in the old-age share of a country over the 50-year period, would result 
in a decrease in economic growth of 0.3%2. This result is in line with the findings of Bloom et al. 
(2010) who found the coefficient on old-age share to be negative but not significant. There are 
many explanations for such a result. Firstly, it is likely that a higher old-age share is draining the 
income and savings from the working-age share, especially as they require additional healthcare. 
The result of this drain is less capital available for investment in productive assets, either 
physical capital stock or education. Additionally, as the old-age share increases the subsequent 
result is a declining work-force, thus reducing output per person.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Economic growth calculation: (ln(yt) - ln(yt-1))/5 = (-0.0016 * (-10))/5 
2 Economic growth calculation: (ln(yt) - ln(yt-1))/5 =(- 0.0015 * (10))/5	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Other interesting results include the coefficients on trade openness and life expectancy, 
each of which is statistically significant at the one percent level. Using the same thought 
experiment that was used to interpret the demographic coefficients, an increase in trade openness 
of 50 percentage points (the change, according to the Penn World Table 7.1, that was 
experienced by Germany over the 50 year period) would result in an increase in economic 
growth of 0.1%3. Furthermore, if considering an incline in life expectancy of 26 years, the 
coefficient implies an increase in economic growth of 0.88%4. Again, this thought experiment is 
relevant to the countries in the study, since Peru experienced this exact incline in their life 
expectancy over the 50 year period, from 48 years in 1960 to 74 years in 2010 (Penn World 
Table 7.1).  
The first result for trade openness seems reasonable, since greater trade capabilities, both 
internal and external, are drivers of economic growth. However, the result for life expectancy is 
somewhat surprising and raises questions as to why a higher life expectancy increases economic 
growth. A possible answer could be that a greater life expectancy has come about through more 
advanced healthcare, and thus makes the entire population, and in particular the workforce, more 
productive. Another reason could be that people are now continuing to work until an older age, 
which contributes to a larger workforce and higher total output.  
The results of the second part of the methodology are shown in Figure 1.10. It separates 
each region’s growth difference from the world average into demographic, non-demographic and 
regional residuals.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Economic growth calculation: (ln(yt) - ln(yt-1))/5 = (0.0001 * (50))/5 
4 Economic growth calculation: (ln(yt) - ln(yt-1))/5 = (0.0017 * (26))/5	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In this discussion I focus on the demographic effects, which can be seen as the red 
colored bars in Figure 1.10. To aid this discussion I have created Table 1.4, which shows the 
average of each demographic variable for each region over the 50-year study period.  
 
The first interpretation is that demographic effects are not significant contributors of 
economic growth for most regions. For East Asia, Europe, North America, Oceania and 
Southeast Asia, the demographic changes had positive impacts on economic growth, while for 
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Latin America, the Middle East & North Africa, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa the 
demographic changes had negative impacts. In general, the chart shows that for regions that have 
outpaced the world average economic growth (positive blue bar), the demographic impacts are 
also positive. In contrast, for regions that have underperformed against the world average 
economic growth (negative blue bar), the demographic impacts are also negative. From this, it 
can be inferred that more economically developed regions have potentially benefited over the 
last 50 years from population aging, while less economically developed regions have not.  
I will not imply a direct causal relationship between population aging and economic 
growth. Instead, the amount of economic growth that can be accounted for by population aging 
will be discussed as a two-way relationship. The above results have supported the initial 
hypothesis, since it seems that more developed regions have benefited from population aging. 
There are various reasons that can explain why this result has come about.  
Firstly, as a ‘population ages’ the youth-age share declines and the old-age share inclines. 
It can be seen in Table 1.4 that, in general, the more economically developed nations that have 
outpaced the world economic growth, including East Asia, Europe, North America, Oceania and 
Southeast Asia, have relatively lower youth-age shares and higher old-age shares. It is likely that 
this has pushed a large bubble of the population through the working-age share over the last 50 
years. As such, more people in the workforce can explain the greater economic activity and thus 
greater growth in each of these regions.  
The relationship extends to become ‘two-way’ when considering the impacts that greater 
growth and development have on the demographics of a nation or region. Until this point 
behavioral responses to both the aging population and greater economic development have not 
been considered. Firstly, it is generally the case that well-developed regions have lower fertility 
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rates (contributing to population aging) than under-developed regions. As such, women in these 
economically developed regions have fewer children to care for in their homes. This is likely to 
have resulted in a significant increase in the number of women in the workforce, and also an 
increase in the number of hours spent working by both parents. This behavioral change supports 
the two-way relationship of economic growth and population aging, as they cause and impact 
each other.  
Furthermore, retirement behavior is likely to have changed significantly in many of the 
countries in strong economically developed regions. Many people in these regions work well 
beyond the assumed 65-year retirement age, especially in North America. This is not surprising 
when considering the significant increase in life expectancy that has occurred in all of these 
regions. Table 1.4 shows that the regions that have been previously discussed as having higher 
economic growth than the world average, also have relatively higher life expectancy ages than 
under-performing regions.  
The findings of this study are very much in line with previous papers on the topic of 
population aging. In particular, Bloom et al. (2010) found the impact of population aging on 
economic growth to be ambiguous due to various behavioral factors. These same behavioral 
responses are those which I have discussed and which inform the results of my research. In 
particular, both of our studies have found a negative relationship between the youth-age share 
and economic growth. That is, a declining youth-age share that has resulted from lower fertility 
rates has positive impacts on economic growth. For well-developed countries in this situation, 
having fewer in the youth-age share reduces the dependency of children on each working-age 
individual, thus draining less capital from the working-age share. In addition, Bloom et al. (2010) 
found that as the proportions of youth, working, and old age varied, the savings patterns of 
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nations adjusted. This could also be a factor driving the results in this study, since regions that 
have a greater portion of their population either in the workforce or retired, are likely to have 
higher savings rates and more capital available for investment in human and capital stock.  
Another possible factor explaining the above results is the increased investment in 
education per youth-age individual. This is likely due to the higher household income in these 
regions and also fewer people in the youth-age share. This reasoning also demonstrates the two-
way relationship, since the smaller youth-age share allows for greater investment in human 
capital per person, which in turn enhances economic growth. This rationale was also discussed 
by Bloom et al. (2010). Furthermore, Fougère and Mérette (1999) found a similar result, 
although they used an Overlapping Generations Model to make their prediction.  
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The overarching question this research seeks to answer is: How much of a region’s 
economic growth can be accounted for by population aging? The most significant results relate 
to the direction of the demographic effect. Most prominently, it seems that more economically 
developed regions have potentially benefited from population aging, while less economically 
developed regions have not. I have provided an in-depth discussion of various explanations for 
this relationship, many of which are in line with previous studies. An important aspect of these 
findings is the two-way relationship between population aging and economic growth. This study 
does not imply a direct causal relationship between the variables.  
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There are possibilities for lines of further research beyond this study. Using the same 
methodology, it would be interesting to separate the countries differently. Instead of comparing 
the impacts of demographic structure changes by region, this could be done by income per capita 
level, or by government type. It is likely that the first of these studies will support the finding that 
well-economically developed countries have seen positive impacts from an aging population. 
Furthermore, it would be interesting to determine if the type of government and their policies 
relating to demographics, have common relationships with economic growth.  
This current study will be important for future policy implications. Understanding the 
extent to which demographic changes have impacted economic growth over the past 50 years can 
help inform policy makers as they consider their projected demographic changes. In particular, 
since the major demographic change that has driven economic growth for well-developed 
regions has been the higher working-age share resulting from declining fertility rates, less-
developed regions could expect similar impacts as they move through the development cycle. 
Furthermore, well-developed regions that have benefited from the increased working-age over 
the past fifty years must learn how to support the larger old-age share as their current enlarged 
working-age shares retire. A limitation of this research is that it does not empirically answer 
questions surrounding the causes of these demographic changes, but rather it provides likely 
explanations. Its main purpose is to examine how much population aging impacts economic 
growth in each region.  
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